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Abstract
In this paper we consider a post-quantum digital signature scheme
based on low-density generator matrix codes and propose efficient al-
gorithmic solutions for its implementation. We also review all known
attacks against this scheme and derive closed-form estimates of their
complexity when running over both classical and quantum comput-
ers. Based on these estimates, we propose new parametrization for the
considered system to achieve given pre-quantum and post-quantum se-
curity levels. Finally, we provide and discuss performance benchmarks
obtained through a suitably developed and publicly available reference
implementation of the considered system.
1 Introduction
Devising efficient post-quantum cryptographic schemes is a primary chal-
lenge, as also witnessed by the recently started NIST post-quantum stan-
dardization initiative [1]. Among post-quantum cryptographic primitives,
solutions based on error correcting codes and lattices play a primary role.
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In this paper we deal with post-quantum cryptographic primitives based
on codes and, in particular, code-based digital signatures. While it is rel-
atively simple to devise code-based public key encryption schemes, mostly
derived from the well-known McEliece system [2], the same cannot be said for
digital signature schemes. In fact, code-based public-key encryption schemes
are characterized by an expansion of the plaintext into the ciphertext, due
to the redundancy added by encoding. Such an expansion results in the fact
that some of the bit-strings of the same length of a ciphertext do not belong to
the encryption function codomain. Therefore, it is not possible to exploit the
same symmetry present in, e.g., the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) scheme,
to derive a signature scheme from a public key encryption cryptosystem.
This makes the problem of finding secure yet efficient code-based digital
signature schemes a challenging one. Currently, the scheme introduced by
Curtois, Finiasz and Sendrier (CFS) [3] is the best known solution to this
problem, withstanding seventeen years of cryptanalysis. The main drawback
of this scheme is the need of decoding any syndrome vector obtained as the
hash of the message to be signed, which is addressed appending a counter to
the message or performing complete decoding. This solution however yields
choices of the code parameters resulting in high complexity [4] and may
weaken the system security [5]. More recent approaches exploit different
families of codes, such as low-density generator matrix (LDGM) codes [6]
and codes in the (U |U +V ) form [7], in order to design more practical code-
based digital signature schemes.
In this paper we focus on the former solution, and describe a code-based
digital signature scheme we name Low-dEnsity generator matrix coDe-bAsed
digital signature algorithm (LEDAsig). It implements and improves the
LDGM code-based digital signature scheme proposed in [8], that is standing
since 2013 as a very fast code- based digital signature scheme with very com-
pact public keys. In fact, this system has been implemented on embedded
hardware achieving the fastest implementation of code-based signatures in
open literature, with a signature generation throughputs of around 60, 000
signatures per second [9].
This code-based signature scheme is characterized by very fast key gen-
eration, signature generation and signature verification procedures. This is
achieved by exploiting a special instance of the syndrome decoding prob-
lem (SDP) which allows to reduce decoding to a straightforward vector ma-
nipulation. This is done by considering only a subset of all possible syn-
dromes, formed by those having a fixed and low Hamming weight. For this
reason, we can say that LEDAsig relies on the sparse SDP, which however
is not easier to solve than the general SDP without efficient algorithms ex-
ploiting the secret structure of the code.
The main known attacks against LEDAsig are those already devised
against the system in [8], plus statistical attacks recently introduced in [10].
As shown in [10], the digital signature scheme proposed in [8] can use the
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same keypair to perform a limited amount of signatures, before this ex-
poses the system to statistical attacks that may be able to recover the secret
key. LEDAsig defines new choices of the system parameters which allow to
achieve a reasonably long lifespan for each key pair. Besides detailing re-
cent statistical attacks, we carefully analyze all known attacks and provide a
parametrization for LEDAsig to achieve some computational security guar-
antees, taking into account the cost reduction which follows from the use of
a quantum computer in the solution of the underlying computationally hard
problems. We also provide efficient algorithmic solutions for the implemen-
tation of all the LEDAsig functions. These solutions have been included in
a reference software implementation of LEDAsig that is publicly available in
[11]. Based on this implementation, we carry out performance benchmarks
of LEDAsig and provide performance figures that highlight its benefits in
terms of signature generation and verification time.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the scheme
and the efficient algorithmic solutions we propose for its implementation.
In Section 3 we consider all known attacks that can be mounted against
LEDAsig and provide complexity estimates by considering both classical
and quantum computers. In Section 4 we design some system instances to
achieve given security levels (SLs). In Section 5 we assess performance based
on the reference implementation of LEDAsig. In Section 6 we provide some
conclusive remarks.
2 Description of the Scheme
Following [8], in LEDAsig the secret and the public keys are the character-
istic matrices of two linear block codes: a private quasi-cyclic low-density
generator matrix (QC-LDGM) code and a public quasi-cyclic (QC) code de-
rived from the former. Some background concepts about these codes are
recalled in Section 2.1. In the description of the cryptoscheme, two public
functions are used: a hash function H and a function FΘ that converts the
output vector of H into a sparse vector s with length r and weight w (≪ r).
The vector s is a public syndrome vector resulting from the signature gen-
eration procedure. The output of FΘ is uniformly distributed over all the
r-bits long vectors with weight w, and depends on a parameter Θ, which is
chosen for each message to be signed and is made public by the signer.
The design of FΘ is discussed next, where we provide a procedural de-
scription of the main steps of LEDAsig, i.e., key generation, signature gener-
ation and signature verification. We also provide some methods to accelerate
the generation of the elements of the private key and to guarantee the non-
singularity condition which is required for some of the involved matrices.
Efficient representations of the matrices involved in LEDAsig are also intro-
duced. In the procedural descriptions we consider the following functions:
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• randGen(x, y): generates y distinct integers in {0, 1, . . . , x− 1};
• matrGen(x, y): generates a random binary x× y matrix;
• circGen(x,w): generates a random x × x circulant matrix with row
(and column) weight equal to w;
• permGen(x): generates a random x× x permutation matrix.
We use⊗ to denote the Kronecker product, while the classical matrix product
is denoted with · only when the Kronecker product appears in the same
equation, otherwise it is omitted. We denote as Ai,j the element of matrix
A in the i-th row and j-th column. We use 0n×m to denote the n ×m null
matrix and 1n×m to denote the n×m matrix with all entries equal to one.
2.1 Coding Background
Let Fk2 denote the k-dimensional vector space defined over the binary field F2.
A binary linear block code, denoted as C (n, k), is defined as a bijective linear
map C (n, k) : Fk2 → Fn2 , n, k ∈ N, 0 < k < n, between any binary k-tuple
(i.e., an information word) and a binary n-tuple (denoted as codeword). The
value n is known as the length of the code, while k denotes its dimension.
A generator matrix G (resp. parity-check matrix H) for C (n, k) is a matrix
whose row span (resp. kernel) coincides with the set of codewords of C (n, k).
A binary linear block code is said to be LDGM if at least one of its
generator matrices is sparse, i.e., has a fraction ≪ 1/2 of its entries set to
one. LEDAsig uses a secret binary LDGM code with length n and dimension
k, characterized by a generator matrix in the systematic form
G = [Ik|V ], (1)
where Ik is the k × k identity matrix and V is a sparse k × r matrix (with
r = n − k being the code redundancy). As it will be shown next, a special
form of V is considered, known as QC form, which makes the LDGM code a
QC code as well. The rows of G have fixed Hamming weight wg ≪ n, which
means that V has constant row weight equal to wg − 1.
Due to their sparse nature, it is very likely that, by adding two or more
rows of the generator matrix of an LDGM code, a vector with Hamming
weight > wg is obtained. If the linear combination of any group of rows of G
yields a codeword with weight greater than or equal to wg, then the LDGM
code has minimum distance wg. This is even more likely if the rows of G are
chosen in such a way as to be quasi-orthogonal, that is, with a small number
of overlapping ones.
The code defined by G in eq. (1) admits a sparse parity-check matrix H
in the form
H = [V T |Ir], (2)
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where Ir is the r × r identity matrix. Due to the sparsity of V , the parity-
check matrix H in eq. (2) is a sparse matrix as well. Therefore, an LDGM
code with generator matrix as in eq. (1) also is a low-density parity-check
(LDPC) code.
The special class of LDGM codes used in LEDAsig is that of QC-LDGM
codes, having generator and parity-check matrices formed by circulant bocks
with size p × p, p ∈ {2, 3, . . . , r}. In fact, the QC property allows to reduce
the memory needed to store these matrices, and yields important advantages
in terms of algorithmic complexity. In case of a QC-LDGM code, the k × r
matrix V in eq. (1) and eq. (2) is denoted as V˜ and has the following general
form
V˜ =

V˜0,0 V˜0,1 V˜0,2 . . . V˜0,r0−1
V˜1,0 V˜1,1 V˜1,2 . . . V˜1,r0−1
V˜2,0 V˜2,1 V˜2,2 . . . V˜2,r0−1
...
...
...
. . .
...
V˜k0−1,0 V˜k0−1,1 V˜k0−1,2 . . . V˜k0−1,r0−1
 , (3)
where V˜i,j represents either a sparse circulant matrix or a null matrix with
size p × p. Hence, in this case the code length, dimension and redundancy
are n = n0p, k = k0p and r = (n0 − k0)p = r0p, respectively. For the rest of
the paper, we will use the superscript ∼ to denote QC matrices and, for a
given QC matrix A˜, we refer to its circulant block at position (i, j) as A˜i,j.
Since a circulant matrix is defined by one of its rows (conventionally the
first), storing a binary matrix V˜ as in eq. (3) requires k0r0p bits, yielding
a reduction by a factor p with respect to a matrix with a general form.
Moreover, given the sparse form of the matrices, a further size reduction can
be achieved storing only the positions of the set coefficients of each first row
of a circulant block.
The set of p×p binary circulant matrices form a ring under the operations
of modulo-2 matrix addition and multiplication. The zero element is the all-
zero matrix, and the identity element is the p × p identity matrix. If we
consider the algebra of polynomials mod (xp − 1) over F2, F2[x]/〈xp + 1〉,
the following map is an isomorphism between this algebra and that of p× p
circulant matrices over F2
A˜↔ a (x) =
p−1∑
i=0
aix
i. (4)
According to eq. (4), any binary circulant matrix is associated to a poly-
nomial in the variable x having coefficients over F2 which coincide with the
entries in the first row of the matrix, i.e.,
a (x) = a0 + a1x+ a2x
2 + a3x
3 + · · · + ap−1xp−1. (5)
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Also according to eq. (4), the all-zero circulant matrix corresponds to the
null polynomial and the identity matrix to the unitary polynomial. In the
same way, the set of r0p×r0p QC matrices formed by circulant blocks of size
p×p is a ring under the standard operations of modulo-2 matrix addition and
multiplication. The null element corresponds to the null r0p×r0pmatrix, the
identity element is the r0p × r0p identity matrix Ir0p. Matrices in QC form
can be efficiently represented by the polynomials associated to the circulant
blocks, leading to very compact representations.
The LDGM codes used in LEDAsig are described by generator matrices
with constant row weight wg ≪ n, a feature which ie employed to easily
obtain a random codeword c with weight wc ≈ mgwg, with mg being a small
integer. In fact, since the rows of the generator matrix are sparse, it is very
likely that, by adding together a few of them, the Hamming weight of the
resulting vector is about the sum of the Hamming weights of its addends,
bar some cancellations due to overlapping ones. If the sum of a set of rows
does not fit the desired weight wc, some other row can be added, or some row
replaced, or another combination of rows can be tested, in order to approach
wc. In fact, using codewords with weight slightly smaller than wc may still
allow achieving the target security level. In any case, generating a codeword
with weight equal or almost equal to wc can be accomplished very quickly.
Based on these considerations, the number of random codewords with
weight close to wc which can be easily generated at random from an LDGM
code having row weight of G equal to wg, with wg dividing wc, can be roughly
estimated as
Awc ≈
(
k
wc
wg
)
. (6)
2.2 Private Key Generation
The private key in LEDAsig includes the characteristic matrices of an LDGM
code C with length n, dimension k and co-dimension r = n−k. In particular,
we consider circulant matrices of size p, and so we have n0 = n/p, k0 = k/p
and r0 = r/p. We denote the generator and the parity-check matrix as G˜ and
H˜, respectively. Because of their systematic forms (1) and (2), these matrices
can be represented just through V˜ . The public key is a dense r0p× n0p QC
matrix.
2.2.1 Generation of H˜ and G˜
The generator and parity-check matrices of the secret LDGM code have the
form (1) and (2), respectively. They are both obtained starting from V˜ ,
which is generated as described in Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1: Generation of V˜
Input: p: size of a circulant block
r0: code dimension divided by circulant block size
k0: code redundancy divided by circulant block size
wg: weight of a row of V˜
Output: V˜
1 V˜ ← 0k0p×r0p
2 for i← 0 to k0 − 1 do
3 [t0, t1, . . . , twg−2]←randGen(r0, wg − 1)
4 for j ← 0 to wg − 2 do
5 V˜i,tj ← circGen(p, 1)
6 return V˜
Algorithm 2: Generation of S˜
Input: p: size of a circulant block
n0:code size divided by circulant block size
ms: weight of a row of S˜
Output: S˜
1 S˜ ← 0n0×n0
2 E˜ ←circGen(n0,ms)
3 Π(1) ←permGen(n0)
4 Π(2) ←permGen(n0)
5 E′ ← Π(1) · E˜ · Π(2)
6 Λ˜← 0p×n0p
7 Φ˜← 0p×n0p
8 for i← 0 to n0 − 1 do
9 Λ˜i ← circGen(p, 1)
10 Φ˜i ← circGen(p, 1)
11 for i← 0 to n0 − 1 do
12 for j ← 0 to n0 − 1 do
13 if E′i,j = 1 then
14 S˜i,j ← Λ˜i · Φ˜j
15 else
16 S˜i,j ← 0p×p
2.2.2 Generation of S˜ and S˜−1
The matrix S˜ is a pn0 × pn0 binary matrix, with constant row and column
weight equal to ms. There are several methods for generating such a matrix.
We consider the procedure described in Algorithm 2, which allows an efficient
computation of S˜−1.
According to Algorithm 2, and denoting as Diag (A0, A1, · · · , Al−1) a
(pl) × (pl) diagonal matrix with p × p blocks A0, A1, · · · , Al−1 along the
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main diagonal, we can write:
S˜ = Diag
(
Λ˜0, Λ˜1, · · · , Λ˜n0−1
) [(
Π(1)E˜ ·Π(2)
)
⊗ Ip
]
·Diag
(
Φ˜0, Φ˜1, · · · , Φ˜n0−1
)
= Diag
(
Λ˜0, Λ˜1, · · · , Λ˜n0−1
)
·
(
Π(1) ⊗ Ip
)
·
(
E˜ ⊗ Ip
)
·
(
Π(2) ⊗ Ip
)
·Diag
(
Φ˜0, Φ˜1, · · · , Φ˜n0−1
)
(7)
= S˜Π˜Λ · (E˜ ⊗ Ip) · .
where
Π˜Λ= Diag
(
Λ˜0, Λ˜1, · · · , Λ˜n0−1
)
· (Π(1) ⊗ Ip) ,
Π˜Φ=
(
Π(2) ⊗ Ip
) ·Diag (Φ˜0, Φ˜1, · · · , Φ˜n0−1) . (8)
Based on eq. (7), we have
S˜−1 = Π˜−1Φ · (E˜−1 ⊗ Ip) · Π˜−1Λ . (9)
Now, since Π˜Λ and Π˜Φ are permutation matrices, their inverses correspond
to their transposes, yielding
S˜−1 = Π˜TΦ · (E˜−1 ⊗ Ip) · Π˜TΛ. (10)
This approach allows to achieve significant speedups in the inversion of S˜,
since the most complex part of the computation is the inversion of E˜, which
is an n0×n0 matrix, with n0 being typically two orders of magnitude smaller
than the code length n. The existence of E˜−1 is sufficient to guarantee that S˜
is non singular. If we choosems odd and n0 such that (x
n0+1)/(x+1) ∈ F2[x]
is irreducible [12], then E˜−1 always exists.
2.2.3 Generation of Q˜ and Q˜−1
The matrix Q˜ is a pr0 × pr0 matrix obtained as
Q˜ = R˜+ M˜, (11)
where R˜ is a dense matrix with rank z ≪ pr0 and M˜ is a sparse matrix.
The density of M˜ can be considered as a parameter of the system design.
In the following, we assume that M˜ has constant row and column weight
equal to 1 (i.e., it is a permutation matrix), since this choice has several
advantages from the complexity standpoint. In particular, we propose the
following construction for the matrices in the r.h.s. of (11):{
R˜ =
(
A · BT )⊗ 1p×p = (A⊗ 1p×1) · (BT ⊗ 11×p),
M˜ = (Π⊗ Ip) · Ψ˜,
(12)
in which A and B are two r0×z random binary matrices, Ψ˜ = Diag(Ψ˜0, Ψ˜1, · · · , Ψ˜r0−1)
denotes a QC diagonal matrix having the circulant permutation matrices Ψ˜i
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Algorithm 3: Generation of M˜,A,BT
Input: p: size of a circulant block
r0: code redundancy divided by circulant block size
z: maximum rank of ABT
Output: M˜,A,BT , D
1 D ← 0r0×r0
2 while det(D) = 0 and p mod 2 = 1 do
3 Π←permGen(r0)
4 A←matrGen(z, r0)
5 BT ←matrGen(r0, z)
6 D ← Iz +BTΠTA
7 M˜ ← 0r0p×r0p
8 for i← 0 to r0 − 1 do
9 Ψ˜i ←circGen(n0,ms)
10 for j ← 0 to r0 − 1 do
11 if Πi,j = 1 then
12 M˜i,j ← Ψ˜i
along the main diagonal and Π is an r0× r0 permutation matrix. We choose
z < r0, such that the matrix A · BT has maximum rank z < r0; since 1p×p
has rank equal to 1, the rank of R˜ equals the one of A ·BT , and so cannot be
larger than z. The overall row and column weight of M will be denoted as
mT in the following. As we show next, the inverse of Q˜ can be easily com-
puted and its existence depends on the choice of M˜ and R˜. This is already
considered in Algorithm 3 for their generation.
For the sake of simplicity, let us define A∗ = A⊗1p×1 and B∗ = B⊗1p×1.
We exploit the following result to obtain a strategy for performing an efficient
inversion of Q.
Woodbury identity : Given two n × n matrices W and F , where F =
UCL, we have
(W + F )−1 = W−1 −W−1U(C−1 + LW−1U)−1LW−1. (13)
In the case of Q˜, we have W = M˜ and F = R˜, so U = A∗, C = Iz and
L = B∗T . Using the Woodbury identity, we obtain
Q˜−1 = M˜−1 + M˜−1A∗
(
Iz +B
∗T M˜−1A∗
)−1
B∗T M˜−1. (14)
In order to facilitate the computation of Q˜−1, let us first consider that M˜−1 =
9
M˜T . We have
M˜−1A∗ = Diag
(
Ψ˜T0 , Ψ˜
T
1 , · · · , Ψ˜Tr0−1
)
· (ΠT ⊗ Ip) · (A⊗ 1p×1)
= Diag
(
Ψ˜T0 , Ψ˜
T
1 , · · · , Ψ˜Tr0−1
)
· (ΠT ·A)⊗ (Ip · 1p×1)
= Diag
(
Ψ˜T0 , Ψ˜
T
1 , · · · , Ψ˜Tr0−1
)
· [(ΠT ·A)⊗ 1p×1]
=
(
ΠT ·A) ⊗ 1p×1. (15)
The last equality is justified by the fact that the matrix
[(
ΠT · A)⊗ 1p×1]
can be thought as the composition of vectors that having either the form of
0p×1 or 1p×1, and are thus invariant to permutations. Hence, we have
B∗T · M˜−1 · A∗ = B∗T · [(ΠT · A)⊗ 1p×1] (16)
=
(
BT ⊗ 11×p
) · [(ΠT ·A)⊗ 1p×1]
=
(
BT ·ΠT ·A)⊗ (11×p · 1p×1) . (17)
The product 11×p·1p×1 corresponds to the sum of p ones. Therefore it is equal
to 1 when p is odd and equal to 0 otherwise. Based on these considerations,
we obtain
B∗T M˜−1A∗ =
{
0z×z if p is even
BTΠTA if p is odd,
(18)
and so we can define the matrix D = Iz +B
∗T M˜−1A∗, such that
D =
{
Iz if p is even,
Iz +B
TΠTA if p is odd.
(19)
So, combining these results, regardless of the parity of p, we have that
Q˜−1 = M˜T + M˜TA∗D−1B∗T M˜T . (20)
This expression can be further simplified by considering the special structure
of the involved matrices, thus obtaining the following expression for Q˜−1 that
is convenient from the complexity standpoint:
Q˜−1 = M˜T +
(
ΠT ·A · BT ·ΠT )⊗ 1p×p. (21)
We report the full derivation in Appendix A.
Based on this analysis, we note that the choice of an even p simplifies
the computation of Q˜ and Q˜−1, since it guarantees that Q˜ can always be
inverted because D = Iz. However, it has been recently shown that using
circulant blocks with even size may reduce the security of the systems relying
on them [13]. Therefore, it is advisable to choose odd values of p, although in
this case the non-singularity of Q˜ is no longer guaranteed and more than one
attempt may be needed to generate a non-singular Q˜. We point out that,
in the case of z assuming small values (such as the ones we consider in this
paper) this choice has a negligible impact on the efficiency of the scheme,
since generating D and checking its non-singularity is fast.
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2.3 Public key generation
The public key is simply computed as
H˜ ′ = Q˜−1H˜S˜−1. (22)
Exploiting the systematic structure of H˜, we have
H˜ ′ =
[
Q˜−1V˜ T
∣∣∣ Q˜−1] S˜−1. (23)
2.4 Signature Generation
In order to implement the function FΘ introduced in Section 2, let us con-
sider a constant weight encoding function CW (d, n,w) that takes as input a
binary vector d of given length and returns a length-n vector with weight w.
In particular, given a message m that must be signed, we choose d = H(m),
where H is a public hash function. The input given to the constant weight
encoding function is the concatenation of the digest d with the binary rep-
resentation of the parameter Θ, which can be the value of a counter or a
pseudo-random integer variable. In other words, given a message m, the
parameter Θ is used to obtain several different outputs from the constant
weight encoding function. This feature is necessary because, as we explain
in section 2.4.2, the output of FΘ must be in the kernel of R˜. If, for a given
Θ, the current output does not verify this property, we just change the value
of Θ and try again. The signature of a message m is constituted by the
binary string σ = (e + c)S˜T and the chosen value of Θ, denoted as Θ∗. In
the signature generation, c is a codeword of the code C with weight wc, and e
is an error vector with weight w which is generated from m and Θ∗ through
the function CW .
2.4.1 Random codeword generation
Each signature is built upon a random sparse codeword c, with weight wc ≪
n. As we explained in Section 2.1, such a codeword can be easily obtained by
choosing wc = mgwg, with mg being a small integer. Let u be the length-k
information sequence corresponding to c; thanks to the systematic form of
V˜ , we have
c = uG˜ =
[
u|uV˜
]
. (24)
This means that we can easily obtain such a codeword randomly picking a
sequence u of weight mg and computing the corresponding codeword as in
eq. (24) picking a different set of codewords to be added together if the
weight of the sum does not fit.
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2.4.2 Error vector generation
In order to generate the error vector e, we first compute its syndrome s
as the digest of the message m, through the function FΘ, by choosing a
value of Θ = Θ∗ such that the product s′ = Q˜s has the same weight of s.
Subseuently, the error vector is obtained as e =
[
01×k0p| s′T
]
. We point out
that the constraint on the weight of s′ can be simply satisfied by imposing(
BT ⊗ 11×p
)
s = 0. Indeed, recalling Eq. (12), we have
s′ = Q˜s = M˜s+ R˜s
= M˜s+A∗B∗T s
= Q˜s+ (A⊗ 1p×1)(BT ⊗ 11×p)s.
Since M˜ is a permutation matrix, when the product R˜s is null, s′ just corre-
sponds to a permuted version of s. This condition can be checked efficiently.
First of all, let us write s = [s
(p)
0 , s
(p)
1 , · · · , s(p)r0−1]T , where each s
(p)
i is a length-
p sequence. In the same way, we write s′ = [s
′(p)
0 , s
′(p)
1 , · · · , s′(p)z−1]T . Through
some straightforward computations, it can be verified that s
′(p)
i = 0p×1 only
when the sum of the Hamming weights of the blocks s
(p)
j indexed by the i-th
row of BT is even.
The syndrome s is constructed fromm through CW and has fixed weight
equal to w. An algorithmic way to compute the syndrome s and the corre-
sponding error vector e is described in Algorithm 4. A parameter to optimize
is Θmax, representing the maximum value allowed for Θ, which must be suf-
ficiently large to ensure that a value Θ = Θ∗ such that B∗T s = 0 is found
with very high probability. Thus, by increasing Θmax, the probability of a
signing failure can be made negligible.
To this end, in the implementation we chose to represent the counter Θ
as a 64-bit unsigned integer value. This limits the probability
(
1− 1z
)Θmax
of never finding a 64-bit value Θ∗ such that B∗T s = 0 to 2−512 for z up to
50. We remark that the current parametrization for the proposed LEDAsig
primitive employs z = 2, thus making the failure probability negligible for
all practical purposes. Once the error vector is obtained, the signature is
computed as σ = (e+ c)S˜T .
2.4.3 Number of different signatures
An important parameter for any digital signature scheme is the total number
of different signatures. Computing such a number is useful, for example, to
verify that collision attacks are unfeasible (see Section 3.3). In LEDAsig,
a unique signature corresponds to a specific r-bit vector s, having weight
w. Only vectors s being in the kernel of R˜ are acceptable: since R˜ has rank
equal to z, then its kernel has dimension r−z, which means that the number
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Algorithm 4: Generation of e
Input: b, MT , m, w, Θmax
Output: Θ∗, e
1 ws = 1
2 while {ws > 0} do
3 Θ←randGen(Θmax)
4 d← H ([m|Θ])
5 s← CW (d, w, r0p)
6 i← 0
7 while i < z do
8 ws ← 0
9 for j ← 0 to r0 − 1 do
10 if BTj,i = 1 then
11 ws ← ws + wt(sj)
12 ws ← ws mod 2
13 if ws = 1 then
14 i← z
15 else
16 i← i+ 1
17 s′ ← M˜s
18 e← [01×k0p|s′T ]
19 Θ∗ ← Θ
of binary vectors being in its kernel is equal to 2r−z. We suppose that these
2r−z vectors are uniformly distributed among all the vectors of length r.
This in turn implies that, considering the r-tuples with weight w, we expect
a fraction 2−z of them to be in the kernel of R˜. Thus, the total number of
different signatures is
Ns ≈
(
r
w
)
2z
. (25)
2.5 Signature verification
According to [8], the signature generation basically coincides with the com-
putation of a new syndrome through the public code and the execution of
some checks on the result. The final check consists in verifying that the new
syndrome coincides with the one resulting from feeding the message digest
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Algorithm 5: Verification of σ
Input: H ′, σ, m, Θ∗
Output: ans: Boolean value indicating if the signature is verified or not
1 wσ ← wt(σ)
2 if wσ > (w +mgwg)ms then
3 return false
4 d∗ ← H ([m|Θ∗])
5 s∗1 ← CW (d∗, r0p, w)
6 s∗2 ← H˜ ′σT
7 if s∗1 6= s∗2 then
8 return false
9 else
10 return true
to the CW function. These two vectors should coincide because
H˜ ′σT = H˜ ′S˜(cT + eT )
= Q˜−1H˜S˜−1S˜(cT + eT )
= Q˜−1H˜(cT + eT )
= Q˜−1H˜eT
= Q˜−1Q˜s
= s. (26)
An algorithmic description of the signature verification procedure is re-
ported in Algorithm 5.
3 Security Analysis
In this section we review the main known attack strategies against LEDAsig
and their complexity.
3.1 Decoding attacks
In LEDAsig, an attacker knows that σ = (e + c) · S˜T = e′′ + c′′, with
c′′ = cS˜T being a codeword of the public code, i.e, such that H˜ ′ · c′′T = 0.
Hence, e′′ = eS˜T can be considered as an error vector with weight ≤ msw
affecting the codeword c′′ of the public code and having s as its syndrome.
Therefore, an attack strategy consists in exploiting decoding algorithms for
general linear codes to recover e′′ from s and H˜ ′. If this succeeds, then the
attacker has to find a codeword c′′ of the public code with suitable weight
to be added to e′′ in order to forge a valid signature.
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The problem of finding e′′ from s is known as SDP. If the SDP ad-
mits a unique solution, information set decoding (ISD) algorithms are those
achieving the best performance in solving it.
In order to determine whether the SDP has a unique solution or not, we
need to estimate the minimum distance of the public code. The public code
admits a generator matrix in the form G˜′ = G˜ · S˜T , which is also sparse.
Hence the public code contains low weight codewords, coinciding with the
rows of G˜′, which have weight approximately equal to wgms. Since the
sum of any two or more rows gives a codeword with weight ≥ wgms with
overwhelming probability, we can take wgms as a reliable estimate of the
minimum distance of the public code, which will hence be characterized by
decoding spheres with radius t∗ =
⌊
wgms−1
2
⌋
. Since we want to guarantee
the uniqueness of the SDP solution, we must impose
msw ≤ t∗. (27)
In order to satisfy the previous condition, we choose wg = 2w + 1, leading
to t∗ = wms +
⌊
ms−1
2
⌋
. With this choice, we guarantee that there is no
algorithm that can solve the SDP more efficiently than ISD, thus we consider
the ISD work factor (WF) to compute the security level of LEDAsig against
decoding attacks.
The ISD approach, which was pioneered by Prange in [14], attempts
at performing the decoding of a general linear code more efficiently than an
exhaustive search approach. Subsequent improvements of Prange’s algorithm
were presented by Lee and Brickell [15], Leon [16] and Stern [17]. Among
these variants, Stern’s algorithm [17] is currently the one best exploiting the
speedups provided by quantum computers, as shown in [18]. In particular,
a significant portion of Stern’s algorithm can be solved employing Grover’s
algorithm [19] to reduce the running time to the square root of the one needed
for the computation on a classical platform. By contrast, when execution on
classical computers is considered, the most efficient ISD turns out to be the
Becker-Joux-May-Meurer (BJMM) algorithm proposed in [20], which is part
of a family of results on the subject [21, 22, 23, 24]. All the aforementioned
approaches have a running time growing exponentially in the effective key
size of the scheme (a function of the number of errors, code size and rate),
regardless of the availability of a quantum computer.
As a consequence, the security levels against attackers performing a de-
coding attack (DA) with classical computers have been estimated by con-
sidering the WF of the BJMM algorithm, while the security levels against
quantum computer-equipped attackers were computed taking into account
Stern’s algorithm.
We defend LEDAsig from DAs employing parameters which prevent the
syndrome decoding from succeeding given a computational power bounded
by the desired security level. To this end, we take into account the fact that
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the nature of the QC codes employed in LEDAsig provides a speedup by a
factor
√
p with respect to the running time of the ISD algorithm employed
to perform decoding of a general linear code [25].
3.1.1 Quantum Stern’s algorithm
Considering the fact that Stern’s algorithm [17] is the one best suited for
quantum computer execution, and will thus be employed to determine the
parameters of LEDAsig, we briefly resume the results in [18], describing how
the application of Grover’s algorithm to ISD algorithms can be taken into
account when computing the complexity of key recovery attacks (KRAs) and
DAs.
An ISD algorithm is an algorithm A (C(n, k), w) taking as input a code
C(n, k) with length n, dimension k, and trying to find a codeword with
weight w or, equivalently, an error vector with weight w given the code and
the corresponding syndrome of the error through the code. In LEDAsig,
employing ISD to perform general decoding we have it acting on an n0p bits
long code, with dimension k0p, trying to correct an error vector with weight
≤ msw.
The basic structure of each ISD algorithm is essentially the same, and
relies on the identification of an information set, that is, guessing a set of
error-free positions in the error-vector, corresponding to a set of k linearly
independent columns of the generator matrix of the code. Recovering the
entries of the error vector affecting this set is enough to reconstruct the whole
error vector. The algorithm must be run iteratively, and each iteration has
a probability of success pA. Thus, the expected number of iterations that
makes the attack successful is 1pA . The probability pA is obtained as the
product of pinv and pe, where pinv is the probability that an iteration of ISD
has selected a set of k linearly independent vectors, while pe is the probability
that the error vector entries affecting the selected set can be recovered. It
can be proven that pinv converges to pinv ≈ 0.29 as the size of the binary
matrix being inverted increases [18], while for pe we have
pe =
(
w
2j
)(
n−w
k−2j
)(
2j
j
)(
n−k−w+2j
l
)
4j
(n
k
)(n−k
l
)
according to [17], where l and j are parameters which influence the com-
plexity of the algorithm and must be optimized to minimize the value of
pe.
Taking into account the speedup following from the application of Grover’s
algorithm to Stern’s algorithm, it follows that the algorithm is successful af-
ter performing only pi4
√
1
pA
= pi4
√
1
pinvpe
iterations on average, instead of
1
pinvpe
. Let us define:
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• cdec as the cost in qubit operations of decoding the input qubits to the
inputs of the classical algorithm which must be performed whenever
an iteration is completed on the quantum computer;
• cit as the number of bit operations needed to perform an iteration of
the classical Stern’s algorithm;
• cinv as the cost of inverting the matrix obtained with the k columns
selected during the iteration; in fact, since a quantum implementa-
tion of Stern’s algorithm must be performed entirely with revertible
operations, skipping an iteration is not possible, even if the selected
k columns do not correspond to an information set (i.e., they are not
linearly independent).
By taking the conservative assumption that a qubit operation has the same
cost of a bit operation, it is possible to express the amount of operations
required to execute Stern’s algorithm on a quantum computer as
pi
4
√
1
pinvpe
(cdec + cinv + cit). (28)
Estimating the actual value of cdec may be very hard, since it depends on
the size of the input given to A. For example, some input parameters can be
fixed (in this case, the number of bits needed to represent the input given to
A decreases) but, at the same time, the value of pe might get lower (since, in
this case, we might not consider an optimal input choice). While estimates
for cdec have put it in the 2
30 range [18], we conservatively consider cdec = 0.
Finally, to compute the two remaining computational costs, we refer to the
following expressions (from [17])
cit = 2lj
(
k/2
j
)
+ 2j(n − k)
(
k/2
j
)2
2−l, (29)
cinv =
1
2
(n− k)3 + k(n− k)2. (30)
We point out that, for the cases we are interested in, the values of (28)
slightly depend on cdec, so we can conservatively neglect it, without signifi-
cant variations in the attack complexity.
3.1.2 BJMM algorithm complexity.
As already mentioned, when only classical computers are available, the most
efficient ISD algorithm turns out to be the BJMM algorithm proposed in [20].
A precise estimate of the WF of this algorithm in the finite-length regime can
be found in [26], and it has been used to compute the WF of attacks based
on ISD against the proposed instances of LEDAsig, when performed with
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classical computers. While the complete expression of the computational
complexity of the BJMM algorithm is rather involved, we point out that a
simple expression providing an approximate but fairly intuitive expression
for it is reported in [27] and is 2cw, where c = log2
1
1− k
n
.
3.2 Key recovery attacks
An attacker could aim to mount a KRA against LEDAsig, aimed at obtaining
the private key. A potential vulnerability in this sense comes from the use of
LDGM codes: these codes offer the advantage of having a predictable (and
sufficiently high) number of codewords with a moderately low weight wc,
and of making their random selection very easy for the signer. On the other
hand, as pointed out in the previous section, the public code is characterized
by low weight codewords with weight approximately equal to wgmS. Since
G˜′ has k rows, and summing any two of them gives higher weight codewords
with overwhelming probability, we can consider that the multiplicity of these
low weight codewords in the public code is k.
It is possible to show that the low weight codeword finding problem is
equivalent to the general linear code decoding problem, thus allowing ISD to
be retrofit to this task too. Thus, rows of G˜′ might be recovered using ISD
algorithms to search for codewords of weight ≤ wgmS in the public code.
We assume that knowing one row of G˜ can be enough to recover the whole
matrix, even if this is a very conservative approach. Taking into account the
multiplicity of low weight codewords, we consider a speedup factor of k, with
respect to the application of ISD to a general code.
As already explained in Section 3.1, in the case of a quantum computer-
equipped attacker, the best ISD algorithm is Stern’s algorithm, (described
in Section 3.1.1), while in the case of a classical computer, the best solution
is the BJMM algorithm (described in Section 3.1.2).
Another possible vulnerability comes from the fact that an attacker could
obtain the vector space generated by BT ⊗ 11×p, as well as its dual space,
by observing O(r) public syndromes s, since BT ⊗ 11×p · s = 0z×1. Hence,
we can suppose that an attacker knows an r× r matrix U such that R˜ ·U =
0 ⇒ Q˜ · U = M˜ · U . The attacker also knows that H˜ ′ = Q˜−1 · H˜ · S˜−1 and
that the public code admits any non-singular generator matrix in the form
G′X = X ·G˜ · S˜T , which becomes G′Q˜ = Q˜ ·G˜ · S˜
T for X = Q˜. The matrix G′I ,
which corresponds to the choice of X = I, is likely to be the most sparse one
among them, and it can be attacked by searching for low weight codewords
in the public code, as we have already observed. On the other hand, knowing
V does not help to reduce the complexity of attacking either H˜ ′ or one of the
possible G′X , hence it cannot be exploited by an attacker to perform a KRA.
A newly devised attack which is more efficient in recovering the secret key is
instead targeted against the matrix S˜T , and will be discussed in Section 3.7.
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3.3 Collision attacks
As for any other hash-and-sign scheme, classical collision birthday attacks
represent a threat for LEDAsig. Since the system admits up to Ns different
signatures, whereNs is given by (25), it is sufficient to collect ≈
√
Ns different
signatures to have a high probability of finding a collision with a classical
computer. Hence, the security level reached by the system under classical
computing cannot exceed
√
Ns.
If we consider an attacker provided with a quantum computer, we must
take into account the BHT algorithm [28], implying that the security level
cannot exceed 3
√
Ns.
3.4 Forgery attacks based on right-inverse matrices
In order to forge signatures, an attacker could search for an n×r right-inverse
matrix H˜ ′r of H˜
′. If the signature were dense, it would have been easy to
find a right-inverse matrix able to forge it. In fact, provided that H˜ ′ · H˜ ′T is
invertible, then H˜ ′r = H˜
′T ·
(
H˜ ′ · H˜ ′T
)−1
is a right-inverse matrix of H˜ ′. The
matrix H˜ ′ is dense and the same occurs, in general, for
(
H˜ ′ · H˜ ′T
)−1
. So,
H˜ ′r is dense as well. Then, the attacker could compute f = (H˜
′
r · s)T , which
is a forged signature, and will be dense with overwhelming probability.
However, the right-inverse matrix is not unique. So, the attacker could
search for an alternative, possibly sparse, right-inverse matrix. In fact, given
an n × n matrix Z such that H˜ ′ · Z · H˜ ′T is invertible, H ′′r = Z · H˜ ′T ·(
H˜ ′ · Z · H˜ ′T
)−1
is another valid right-inverse matrix of H˜ ′. We notice that
H ′′r 6= Z · H˜ ′r. When H˜ ′ contains an invertible r × r square block, there is
also another simple way to find a right-inverse. It is obtained by inverting
such block, putting its inverse at the same position (in a transposed matrix)
in which it is found within H˜ ′, and padding the remaining rows with zeros.
In any case, there is no simple way to find a right-inverse matrix that
is also sparse, which is the aim of an attacker. Actually, for the matrix
sizes considered here, the number of possible choices of Z is always huge.
Moreover, there is no guarantee that any of them produces a sparse right-
inverse. Searching for an r × r invertible block within H˜ ′ and inverting it
would also produce unsatisfactory results, since the overall density of H˜ ′−1
is reduced, but the inverse of the square block is still dense.
So, the attacker would be able to forge signatures with a number of
symbols 1 in the order of r/2, that is still too large for the system considered
here. In fact, in all the proposed LEDAsig instances, the density of signatures
is in the order of 1/3 or less.
One could also think of exploiting ISD or low-weight codeword searching
algorithms to find a sparse representation of the column space of H˜ ′r. If
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this succeeds, it would result in a sparse matrix HW = H˜
′
r · W , for some
r × r transformation matrix W . However, in this case, HW would not be a
right-inverse of H˜ ′.
For the above reasons, approaches based on right-inverses are not feasible
for an attacker.
3.5 Forgery attacks based on linear combinations of signa-
tures
As another attack strategy, an opponent might sum a number L of syndromes{
s(1), s(2), · · · , s(L)} and obtain an artificial syndrome s∗ with weight w. By
the sum of the corresponding signatures, he could obtain a signature σ∗
such that s∗ = H˜ ′ · σ∗T . However, σ∗ can be accepted only if it has weight
≤ (w + wc)ms. Since σ∗ is obtained as the sum of sparse vectors, with very
high probability its density is higher than that of the added signatures. An
attacker must hence look for special linear combinations of valid signatures
which produce forged signatures having an acceptably low weight. We denote
this kind of attack as linear combination attack (LCA) and estimate its WF
as follows.
First of all, let us consider the following fact: the signature can be written
as σ = [c+e] · S˜T =
[
u|u · V˜ + s · Q˜T
]
· S˜T , where u is a random information
sequence having weight mg. After the opponent finds a set of L syndromes
leading to an s∗ with the desired weight, he computes the corresponding σ∗
as
σ∗ =
[
L∑
i=1
u(i)
∣∣∣∣∣
L∑
i=1
u(i)V˜ + s∗ · Q˜T
]
· S˜T
=
[
u∗|u∗ · V˜ + s∗ · Q˜T
]
· S˜T . (31)
If u∗ has weight ≤ mg, then the forged signature will have the desired weight.
Since the choice of vector u is independent of the syndrome s, we have
P {wt (s∗) = w, wt (e∗) ≤ wσ} = P {wt (s∗) = w} · P {wt (u∗) ≤ mg} (32)
where wσ = (w + wc)ms. If we define P⊕(N,n,wx, wy) as the probability
that the XOR of N different length-n and weight-wx vectors results in a
vector with weight wy, we have
P {wt (s∗) = w} = P⊕ (L, r, w,w) , (33)
P {wt (u∗) ≤ mg} =
mg∑
x=0
P⊕ (L, k,mg, x). (34)
The expression of P⊕(N,n,wx, wy) can be found in Appendix B.
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The WF of this attack can be computed as
WFLCA =
Cs(L) + Cσ(L)
P {wt (s∗) = w, wt (e∗) ≤ wσ} (35)
where Cs(L) = (L − 1)w is the number of operations needed to sum the L
syndromes and Cσ(L) = (L − 1)wσ is the cost of summing the signatures.
The opponent is free to choose the value of L which minimizes the attack
complexity. For all the proposed LEDAsig instances, the attack is optimized
by choosing L = 2.
Concerning the possible applicability of quantum speedups to forgery
attacks based on linear combinations of syndromes, there is no apparent
way of applying Grover’s algorithm to accelerate these attack procedures.
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that no quantum speedups apply, i.e.,
WF
(pq)
LCA = WF
(cl)
LCA = WFLCA as expressed by eq. (35). However, in order to
provide a conservative option, in the proposed instances of LEDAsig we also
consider the theoretical case in which the maximum possible speedup due to
Grover’s algorithm is achieved, i.e., WF
(pq)
LCA =
√
WF
(cl)
LCA =
√
WFLCA.
3.6 Forgery attacks based on support intersections
If we suppose that e and c have disjoint supports, the effect of the proposed
scheme on the public syndrome s can be seen as the expansion of an r × 1
vector with weight w into a subset of the support of the 1 × n vector σ,
having weight ≤ msw, in which each symbol 1 (set symbol) in s corresponds,
at most, to ms symbols 1 in σ.
An attacker could try to find the w sets of ms (or less) symbols 1 within
the support of σ to be able to compute valid signatures. In this case, he will
work as if the random codeword was absent, that is, c = 01×n. Thus, even
after succeeding, he would be able to forge signatures that are sparser than
the authentic ones. In any case, this is a potential weakness, so we design
the system in such a way as to avoid its occurrence.
To reach the target, the attacker must collect a sufficiently large number
L of pairs (s, σ). Then, he can intersect the supports (that is, compute the
bit-wise AND) of all the vectors s. This way, he obtains a vector sL that
may have a small weight wL ≥ 1. If this succeeds, the attacker analyzes the
vectors σ, and selects the w′L = mswL set bit positions that appear more
frequently. If these bit positions are actually those corresponding to the wL
bits set in sL, then the attacker has discovered the relationship between them.
In principle, it is convenient for the attacker to choose the smallest possible
value of wL. However, for this analysis to be successful it is necessary that
wL ≥ d, where d is the minimum distance of the code defined by the matrix
B introduced in (12) [8]. A general expression of the probability of success
of a SIA is derived next. Let us denote as I the set of w′L bits in e
′ that
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correspond to the wL bits set in sL, and as J the complement of I. The
probability that an attacker finds a vector sL with weight wL and discovers
the w′L bits corresponding to the wL bits set in sL can be computed as
PSIA = P∧(r, {s1, s2, . . . , sL} , wL) · PI≥J,L(wL, wc, w′L), (36)
with the functions P∧(•) and PI≥J,L(•) having the expressions reported in
Appendix B, where the proof of (36) is also reported. Equation (36), how-
ever, is not yet sufficient to compute the WF of a SIA. This is because the
attacker should repeat the procedures so many times as to have a group of
relationships able to cover all possible syndrome vectors with weight w. The
implications of this fact are discussed next.
Let us suppose that wL divides w. After having computed the public
syndrome of the message, the attacker intersects vectors s until he obtains a
vector sL with weight wL having symbols 1 in correspondence of wL out of
the w positions. The probability that this happens is
P∧(r, {s1, s2, . . . , sL} , wL)
(
w
wL
)( r
wL
) .
In order to recover the positions of all the w symbols 1 of the syndrome,
this procedure must be repeated wwL times, at any step i (i = 1, ...,
w
wL
)
involving w − (i − 1)wL positions. Taking into account that the attack at
any step is successful if the bits at positions ∈ I are set more times than the
bits at positions ∈ J , the probability of success at the i-th step results in
P
(i)
SIA = P∧(r, {s1, s2, . . . , sL} , wL) ·
(
w−(i−1)wL
wL
)( r
wL
) PI≥J,L(wL, wc, w′L). (37)
When wL does not divide w, the attacker can follow two strategies. Ac-
cording to the first strategy, the procedure is repeated ⌊ wwL ⌋ times by as-
suming a greater value of wL in the last step. According to the second
strategy, the procedure is repeated ⌈ wwL ⌉ times and, in the last step, the at-
tacker intersects vectors s until he obtains a vector sL with weight wL having
w−
(
⌈ wwL ⌉ − 1
)
wL < wL set symbols in correspondence of as many positions,
and the remaining wL−w+
(
⌈ wwL ⌉ − 1
)
wL set symbols in correspondence of
previously selected positions (i.e., during previous steps, the attacker must
identify these positions). It is easy to verify that the probability that such a
vector sL is found results in
P∧(r, {s1, s2, . . . , sL} , wL)
( ⌈w/wL⌉−1)wL
wL−w+⌈w/wL⌉−1)wL
)( r
wL
) . (38)
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3.6.1 Work factor of a SIA
A realistic estimate of the WF of a SIA can be found as follows. When wL
divides w, the WF for the i-th step of the SIA can be written as
WF
(i)
SIA =
{[
CsL,1
P∧(r, {s1, s2, . . . , sL} , wL) + CsL,2
]
·
( r
wL
)(w−(i−1)wL
wL
) + CI≥J,L
}
1
PI≥J,L(wL, wc, w
′
L)
.
(39)
In this expression, CsL,1 = (L−1)w denotes the number of binary operations
needed to intersect L syndrome vectors, CsL,2 = wL denotes the number of
operations required to check if the wL symbols 1 of the vector sL are in the
desired positions, and CI≥J,L = (L−1)n⌈log2(L)⌉+w′Lr denotes the number
of operations needed to find the w′L bits of e that should correspond to the
wL symbols 1 of sL and verify whether the attack has been successful or not.
More precisely, the first term counts the number of bits set in each posi-
tion of a group of L collected signatures, i.e., (L− 1)n sums, each requiring
⌈log2(L)⌉ bits to store the result (since the sum is not binary). The second
term counts the operations needed to perform the verification step (that is, a
vector-matrix multiplication requiring w′Lr binary operations). In fact, once
having found the w′L set bit positions that appear more frequently within the
L signatures σ, the attacker must check if they actually correspond to the wL
bits set in sL. For this purpose, he can simply check if sL = H
′ · σL, where
σL is the n-bit vector having bits set only in those w
′
L tentative positions.
Finally, the overall WF of SIA is obtained as
WFSIA =
w/wL∑
i=1
WF
(i)
SIA. (40)
When wL does not divide w, the only difference is in the WF of the
last step that, using the first one of the aforementioned strategies, can be
obtained from eq. (39) by replacing
(
w−(i−1)wL
wL
)
with 1. Using the second
strategy, instead, the WF of the last step must be computed as
WF
(⌈w/wL⌉)
SIA =

[
CsL,1
P∧(r, {s1, s2, . . . , sL} , wL) + CsL,2
] ( r
wL
)( (⌈w/wL⌉−1)wL
wL−w+(⌈w/wL⌉−1)wL
) + CI≥J,L

· 1
PI≥J,L(wL, wc, w
′
L)
. (41)
Concerning the possible applicability of quantum speedups to forgery
attacks based on support intersections, there is no apparent way of apply-
ing Grover’s algorithm to speedup these attack procedures. Therefore, it
is reasonable to assume that no quantum speedups apply, i.e., WF
(pq)
SIA =
WF
(cl)
SIA = WFSIA as expressed by (40). However, in order to provide a con-
servative option, in the proposed instances of LEDAsig we also consider the
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theoretical case in which the maximum possible speedup due to Grover’s
algorithm is achieved, i.e., WF
(pq)
SIA =
√
WF
(cl)
SIA =
√
WFSIA.
3.7 Statistical attacks
As shown in [10], the sparse character of the matrix S˜ and the statistical
properties of the signature σ expose the system to a statistical attack based
on the collection of many signatures. In fact, the signature is obtained as
the sum of the columns of S˜ (i.e., rows of S˜T ) selected by the support of
(c+ e). Since both S˜ and (c+ e) are sparse, the probability of cancellations
between symbols 1 is very low. This means that, if the signature bits in
positions i and j are simultaneously set with relatively high probability, this
is likely due to a column of S˜ having two symbols 1 in these positions. An
opponent may then collect a sufficiently large number of signatures, in order
to empirically compute covariances between bits. Then, the dependence
between the covariance value and the supports of the corresponding rows of
S˜ can be exploited to construct an alternative representation of the private
key, which allows to forge sparse and valid signatures.
Let us denote as Cov(σi, σj) the covariance between the i-th and j-th
bits of the signature: if the support of a column of S˜ contains both i and
j (i.e., the supports of the i-th and j-th rows of S˜ are not disjoint), then
Cov(σi, σj) will be larger with respect to the case in which the support of
each column of S˜ does not contain both i and j (i.e., the supports of the i-th
and j-th rows of S˜ are disjoint). As in [10], we neglect the case in which both
i and j are included in the support of more than one column of S˜, which
is extremely rare due to the sparsity of S˜. A simple threshold criterion can
then be used to separate the covariance values in two sets: if Cov(σi, σj)
exceeds some threshold Γ, then the opponent can conclude that there is a
column in S˜ having both i and j in its support. This allows the construction
of a graph G with n nodes, having an edge between the i-th and j-th nodes
only if Cov(σi, σj) ≥ Γ. Once the graph has been obtained, the opponent
can reconstruct a column-permuted version of S˜ by exploiting cliques in the
graph: indeed, each column of S˜ identifies a set of mS pairwise connected
nodes in the graph, forming a clique with size mS . This permuted version of
S˜ can be used to compute a permuted version of Q˜, and by exploiting both
of them the opponent can forge signatures which are sparser than authentic
ones. Then a codeword of the public code must be added to achieve the
same density of a valid signature but, as it is proven in [10], this is not a
serious issue.
This attack is obstructed by the presence of the random codewords,
which influence the covariance distribution. In fact, it might happen that
Cov(σi, σj) has a large value in some cases in which there is no column hav-
ing i and j in its support, because of the interplay between the rows of G˜
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(used to generate the random codeword) and the columns of S˜. In fact, the
signature can be written as
σ = (c+ e) · S˜T = u · G˜ · S˜T + e · S˜T = u · G˜S + e · S˜T . (42)
Thus, the signature is obtained as the sum of rows from G˜S and rows from
S˜T , so the covariance values also depend on the interplay between G˜ and S˜.
In order to take this into account, the covariance classification process can
be performed by using two threshold values Γ1 < Γ2. Then, two graphs are
constructed:
• the graph G1, constructed using Γ1, which must contain every edge
belonging to G;
• the graph G2, constructed using Γ2, which must not contain edges that
are not in G.
These graphs are constructed in such a way that
G2 ⊆ G ⊆ G1. (43)
The following rule is adopted to add edges to G2: an edge between i and k
in G2 is added when there is a value of j for which there are edges between i
and j and between j and k in G2 and {i; j; k} forms a triangle in G1, meaning
that there are edges between i and j, between i and k and between j and
k in G1. With this procedure, the opponent adds edges to G2 until G2 = G.
This attack procedure is based on the empirical estimate of the covariances
between couples of bits, which can be obtained by the observation of several
collected signatures. In order to achieve sufficient statistical confidence of
such estimates, the opponent needs to collect and analyze a sufficiently large
number of signatures. Next we describe an approach that allows computing
a conservative and reliable lower bound on the number of needed signatures
to perform the attack.
3.7.1 Estimate of the attack efficiency
Let us define a lower bound on the number of signatures that an opponent
needs to collect in order to make the attack successful. In particular, we
describe a method to compute the number of signatures for which the prob-
ability of success of the attack does not overcome a fixed threshold. We first
consider the case of codes with general structure, and then show how the QC
structure might yield a significant reduction in the attack complexity. Since
S is sparse, we can assume that the maximum number of positions in which
the supports of any two rows of ST (i.e., columns of S) intersect is equal to 1.
In such a case, each edge in G is associated only to one row of ST ; thus, since
each row of ST corresponds to mS(mS−1)2 edges, the total number of edges in
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G is equal to nmS(mS−1)2 . As explained above, the opponent tries to guess
G by adding edges to G2: if a row of ST is such that no edge is included in
G2, then that row cannot be recovered through the attack. We assume that,
for the attack to be successful, all the rows of ST must be reconstructed by
the opponent. If a row of ST is such that no edge is contained in G2, then
the opponent has no information about that row. He might try proceeding
with an enumeration, but this procedure is infeasible, since each one of such
rows corresponds to
( n
mS
)
candidates. This means that the attack becomes
feasible only when the rows of ST can be reconstructed through this graph
procedure, and this depends on how G2 evolves.
If we denote as σi and σj the signature bits at positions i and j, respec-
tively, then the corresponding covariance is defined as
Cov(σi, σj) = E[σiσj]− E[σi]E[σj ], (44)
where E[·] denotes the mean value. The opponent empirically computes
covariances over the collected signatures. Let us denote as σ(l) the l-th
collected signature, and as σ
(l)
i and σ
(l)
j its corresponding bits at positions i
and j. Thus, the covariance in (44) can be rewritten as
Cov(σi, σj) =
1
N
N∑
l=1
σ
(l)
i σ
(l)
j −
1
N2
N∑
v=1
σ
(v)
i
N∑
u=1
σ
(u)
j (45)
=
1
N
Xi,j − 1
N2
XiXj ,
where Xi,j is the number of signatures in which both bits at positions i and
j are set, while Xi (resp. Xj) is the number of signatures in which the bit at
position i (resp. j) is set. Obviously, Xi,j ≤ Xi and Xi,j ≤ Xj . We denote
as si and sj, respectively, the i-th and j-th rows of S
T , and distinguish
between the cases of si and sj being disjoint or not. Let us denote as b
the number of overlapping ones between these two rows. According to the
above assumption, we have b = 0 or b = 1. The pairs of indexes (i, j) can be
grouped in sets ℑ(b), for b = 0, 1, that are defined as follows:
ℑ(1) = {(i, j) ∈ N× N| ∃v < n s. t. i, j ∈ φ(sv)} ,
ℑ(0) = {(i, j) ∈ N× N| 6 ∃v < n s. t. i, j ∈ φ(sv)} , (46)
where φ(·) denotes the support of a vector.
Since the matrix S is randomly generated, the values Xi and Xj can
be described as the sum of Bernoulli random variables that are equal to 1
with probability ρ˙ and equal to 0 with probability 1− ρ˙. Such a probability
does not depend on the positions i and j and on the value of b, and can be
computed as
ρ˙ = E[σi] =
mS∑
l=1, l odd
(mS
l
)(n−mS
w′−l
)( n
w′
) , (47)
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where w′ denotes the weight of c+ e, and so can be assumed equal to (w +
mgwg).
Analogously, Xi,j can be described as the sum of N Bernoulli random
variables that are equal to 1 with some probability that, however, depends
on b. We denote such a probability as ρ¨(b). In the case of b = 1, the event
of a signature having the i-th and j-th bits simultaneously set can be due to
two different phenomena:
• the signature contains the v-th row of ST , that is the one including
both i and j in its support; we denote the probability of such an event
as ρ¨(1∧v), with
ρ¨(1∧v) =
w′
n
mS−1∑
l=0
l even
mS−1∑
u=0
u even
(mS−1
l
)(mS−1
u
)(n+1−2mS
w′−l−u−1
)( n−1
w′−1
) ; (48)
• the signature does not contain the v-th row but still has the i-th and
j-th bits that are simultaneously set; we denote the probability of such
an event as ρ¨(1∧¬v), with
ρ¨(1∧¬v) =
n− w′
n
mS−2∑
l=1
l odd
mS−2∑
u=1
u odd
(mS−1
l
)(mS−1
u
)(n+1−2mS
w′−l−u
)(n−1
w′
) . (49)
Then, we have
ρ¨(1) = ρ¨(1∧v) + ρ¨(1∧¬v). (50)
For the case of b = 0 we have
ρ¨(0) =
mS∑
l=1
l odd
mS∑
u=1
u odd
(mS
l
)(mS
u
)(n−2mS
w′−l−u
)( n
w′
) . (51)
Let us now take into account two couples of indexes (i1, j1) ∈ ℑ(1) and
(i0, j0) ∈ ℑ(0), and consider the difference between the corresponding covari-
ances computed according to (45), that is,
Xi1,j1
N
− Xi1Xj1
N2
− Xi0,j0
N
− Xi0Xj0
N2
=
Xi1,j1 −Xi0,j0
N
− Xi1Xj1 −Xi0Xj0
N2
. (52)
We can assume that, for sufficiently large values ofN , we have
Xi1Xj1−Xi0Xj0
N2
≪
Xi1,j1−Xi0,j0
N . Indeed, we know that E[Xi1 ] = E[Xi0 ] = E[Xj1 ] = E[Xj0 ]:
this means that the term
Xi1Xj1−Xi0Xj0
N2
is a random variable with null mean
and variance which decreases as N increases. So, from now on we will neglect
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it: this means that, when comparing two covariance values, we can compare
them just by looking at the values of Xi,j . We will use this result in the
following.
Let us now consider all the couples of indexes (i, j) belonging to the same
row of ST , say the v-th one; these couples belong to ℑ(1) and are associated
to mS(mS−1)2 covariances. We define as ρv the probability that at least one of
the edges associated to such covariances is included in the graph G2. First of
all, we compute the probability that the maximum value of Xi,j associated
to these couples is equal to a integer X¯. In order to obtain this probability,
we first need to compute other two probabilities:
• we define as ρXi,j=X¯ the probability that one Xi,j is equal to X¯. We
can compute this probability as
ρXi,j=X¯ =
(
N
X¯
)(
ρ¨(1)
)X¯ (
1− ρ¨(1)
)N−X¯
; (53)
• we define as ρXi,j<X¯ the probability that one Xi,j is lower than X¯. We
can compute this probability as
ρXi,j<X¯ =
X¯−1∑
l=0
(
N
l
)(
ρ¨(1)
)l (
1− ρ¨(1)
)N−l
. (54)
Then, the probability that the Xi,j values associated to couples in the v-th
row have maximum value equal to X¯ can be computed as
ρ∗X¯ =
mS (mS−1)
2∑
l=0
(mS(mS−1)
2
l
)(
ρXi,j=X¯
)l (
ρXi,j<X¯
)mS (mS−1)
2
−l
. (55)
We conservatively suppose that the opponent is able to choose an optimal
threshold for constructing the graph G2: this means that he will set such
a threshold as the maximum value of the covariances associated to couples
belonging to ℑ(0). Based on the above arguments on the values of Xi, we
can just look at the values of Xi,j. For a generic couple (i, j) ∈ ℑ(0), the
probability of the corresponding Xi,j being lower than X¯ is obtained as
ρ′X¯ =
X¯−1∑
l=0
(
N
l
)(
p¨(0)
)l (
1− p¨(0)
)N−l
. (56)
Then, the probability that an edge from the v-th row of ST is included in
G2 can be obtained as
ρ∗∗X¯ =
(
ρ′X¯
)n(n−1)
2
−n
mS(mS−1)
2 . (57)
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Finally, we can compute the probability that at least one edge belonging to
the v-th row of ST is put in G2 by considering all possible values of X¯, that
is:
ρv =
N∑
X¯=0
ρ∗X¯ρ
∗∗
X¯ . (58)
Thus, the probability that the graph G2 contains at least one edge for each
row of ST can be obtained as pG2 = (ρv)
n. This probability can be considered
as a reliable lower bound on the probability of success of the attack. Indeed,
a row of ST can be reconstructed only when a sufficiently large number of
its edges is put in G2. Estimating how much this number should be large to
allow correct reconstruction might be quite hard. However, it is clear that
if no edges from a row are included in the graph, then that row cannot be
reconstructed through the attack.
Let us now fix a probability equal to 2−λ, where λ is the desired security
level, and compute the maximum number Nλ of collected signatures for
which the attack success probability does not overcome 2−λ. This number
corresponds to
Nλ = max
{
N s.t. pG2 < 2
−λ
}
. (59)
In the case of a matrix S˜ with QC structure, the opponent just needs
to reconstruct a subset of all the rows of S˜T , since he can build the missing
rows with cyclic shifts. Indeed, the opponent just needs to determine one
row in the first block of p rows (i.e., the ones from s0 to sp−1), one row in
the second block of p rows (i.e., the ones from sp to s2p−1). Obviously, with
respect to the non-QC case, this leads to a speedup in the attack, meaning
that the value of Nλ gets reduced. Let us consider a block of p rows of S˜
T :
the probability that at least one row of such a block is included in G2 is
p˜v = 1− (1− pv)p . (60)
Thus, the probability that, in the QC case, the graph G2 contains at least
one edge for each row of S˜T can be obtained as
p˜G2 = (p˜v)
n0 . (61)
Similarly to (59), in this case the bound on the number of signatures is
obtained as
N˜λ = max
{
N s.t. p˜G2 < 2
−λ
}
. (62)
4 System Instances
Based on the analysis of all the attacks studied in the previous section, we
can design instances of LEDAsig for achieving some fixed SL. As a guideline
we use the five security categories, numbered from 1 to 5, defined within the
29
NIST post-quantum standardization effort [1]. Category 1 corresponds to
an SL ≥ 2128, categories 2–3 correspond to an SL ≥ 2192 and categories 4–5
correspond to an SL ≥ 2256. We point out that, given a target SL, many
secure system instances can be designed, having different parameters. As a
selection criterion, we first fixed a maximum value of the signature density
δ
(max)
σ . According to the signature generation of LEDAsig, the signature
density is equal to
mS(w+mgwg)
n . So, we have chosen the system parameters
{mS , w,mg, wg, n} in such a way as to achieve the largest possible signature
density ≤ δ(max)σ that allows achieving the target SL of each security category
against all the considered attacks. In the following we propose nine instances
of LEDAsig we have selected, grouped in three classes corresponding to the
three different security categories ,and characterized by a different value of
the maximum signature density δ
(max)
σ . Their parameters are reported in
Table 1.
The instances named a3, b3, c3 and a6, b6, c6 have been designed taking
into account quantum speedups of attacks, where applicable. As discussed
in Sections 3.5 and 3.6, for LCAs and SIAs no quantum speedups apparently
exist. Therefore, no quantum speedups have been considered for those two
attacks. Instead, the instances named α3, β3, γ3 have been designed tak-
ing into account the maximum theoretical speedup which may follow from
the application of Grover’s algorithm to LCAs and SIAs. Therefore, those
instances of LEDAsig, which consider δ
(max)
σ = 1/3, are characterized by a
complexity of LCAs and SIAs which is greater than SL2.
The circulant size p has been chosen as a prime number in order to avoid
possible attacks based on the factorization of p, such as the one proposed
in [29]. For the same reason, we have also chosen r0 as a prime. Increasing
the value of p allows a reduction in the public key size, but its value cannot
exceed r/(2w + 1), otherwise the circulant blocks of matrix V cannot all
be circulant permutation matrices (since some block must have row weight
greater than 1). In addition, we have chosen values of p as close as possible,
but smaller than, a multiple of the assumed machine word size (i.e., 64-bit),
in order to minimize the amount of used machine word space in representing
the p × p circulant blocks of any matrix as polynomials in F2[x]/〈xp + 1〉.
This has the advantage of allowing the data to fit better into the caches of
the executing platform.
The values of n0 have been chosen as primes such that the multiplicative
order of 2 modulo n0 is ordn0(2) = n0−1, and mS is always odd; with these
choices, we guarantee that S is non singular, as explained in Section 2.2.
In Table 2 we provide the WF of the proposed instances of LEDAsig,
computed on the basis of the attacks described in the previous sections. For
each attack, we consider attackers provided with both classical and quantum
computers. Any key pair of LEDAsig must be renewed after generating
a certain number of signatures to prevent statistical attacks of the type
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Table 1: Parameters of the proposed instances of LEDAsig
Category δ
(max)
σ ID n0 r0 p z mT mS w wg mg
1
1/3 a3 227 89 127 2 1 9 42 85 11
1/6 a6 139 83 383 2 1 9 38 77 12
1/3 α3 149 89 509 2 1 23 40 81 13
2–3
1/3 b3 293 149 251 2 1 13 54 109 16
1/6 b6 179 113 1279 2 1 23 46 93 17
1/3 β3 173 103 1663 2 1 43 48 97 22
4–5
1/3 c3 269 149 571 2 1 17 72 145 20
1/6 c6 211 131 3449 2 1 43 54 109 24
1/3 γ3 293 139 3121 2 1 69 66 133 32
Table 2: Number of different signatures, number of random codewords, at-
tack work factors and key pair lifetime for the proposed instances of LEDAsig
Category ID Ns Awc WFSIA WFLCA WF
(pq)
DA WF
(pq)
KRA WF
(cl)
DA WF
(cl)
KRA N˜SL
1
a3 393.49 129.81 152.43 209.87 281.88 540.18 540.02 > 1000 2655
a6 417.75 143.82 128.65 227.56 156.63 276.93 250.12 499.23 973
α3 457.51 161.14 264.84 259.39 372.27 719.39 677.63 > 1000 12002
2− 3
b3 581.18 198.01 203.19 308.49 372.06 715.38 678.13 > 1000 5571
b6 594.66 229.87 192.23 348.86 383.65 732.48 696.34 > 1000 4851
β3 629.57 300.30 394.86 386.01 805.70 > 1000 > 1000 > 1000 34501
4− 5
c3 832.29 260.20 259.47 433.79 553.38 > 1000 > 1000 > 1000 8790
c6 775.34 354.73 266.47 474.62 833.40 > 1000 > 1000 > 1000 14269
γ3 925.90 486.32 517.65 587.59 > 1000 > 1000 > 1000 > 1000 107005
described in [10]. A safe lifetime of any key pair can be estimated with the
approach described in Section 3.7.1. In particular, if we want to provide
a parameter set for a security level SL, then we can use eq. (62) and set
λ = SL. The corresponding lifetime is denoted as N˜SL in Table 2.
5 Benchmarks on a NIST Compliant Platform
For the sake of completeness, we provide the results of a set of execution
time benchmarks performed on the reference implementation that is publicly
available in [11]. Since no platform specific optimizations are exploited, we
expect these results to be quite consistent across different platforms.
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Table 3: Running times for key generation, signature and verification as a
function of the chosen category density (either 13 or
1
6) and Grover speedups
(denoted by an identifier expressed with a greek lowercase letter) on an AMD
Ryzen 5 1600 CPU at 3.2 GHz.
Category ID
KeyGen Sign Sign+Decompress Verify
(ms) (ms) (ms) (ms)
1
a3 35.51 (± 0.96) 0.29 (± 0.02) 1.96 (± 0.06) 28.71 (± 1.12)
a6 27.23 (± 1.18) 0.14 (± 0.01) 1.06 (± 0.04) 31.18 (± 0.56)
α3 43.45 (± 2.24) 0.28 (± 0.04) 1.52 (± 0.04) 51.10 (± 1.51)
2–3
b3 154.49 (± 5.45) 0.27 (± 0.02) 2.29 (± 0.08) 97.83 (± 1.93)
b6 227.14 (± 10.67) 0.55 (± 0.03) 2.30 (± 0.13) 179.89 (± 2.68)
β3 249.69 (± 12.04) 1.11 (± 0.06) 2.62 (± 0.11) 212.19 (± 1.66)
4–5
c3 290.95 (± 11.68) 0.71 (± 0.04) 5.97 (± 0.19) 186.30 (± 1.63)
c6 840.74 (± 31.04) 2.59 (± 0.09) 3.81 (± 0.12) 650.78 (± 5.31)
γ3 1714.01 (± 69.22) 4.27 (± 0.14) 9.16 (± 0.20) 926.35 (± 5.70)
The results were obtained measuring the required time for key genera-
tion, signature and verification as a function of the chosen security category,
the density of the signature (13 or
1
6 ), and whether or not Grover speedups
can be attained on the SIA. The measurements reported are obtained as
the average of 100 executions of the reference implementation compiled with
gcc 6.3.0 from Debian 9 amd64. Given the NIST requirement on the ref-
erence computing platform (an Intel x86_64 CPU) we instructed gcc to
employ the most basic instruction set among the ones fitting the descrip-
tion (-march=nocona option). The generated binaries were run on an AMD
Ryzen 5 1600 CPU at 3.2 GHz, locking the frequency scaling to the top fre-
quency. Table 3 reports the obtained running times and standard deviations
over the measured 100 executions. The main bottleneck of the computation
for the key generation primitive is the materialization of the public code
matrix H ′, as its size exceeds the first level of caches. A similar issue is
also present in the signature verification primitive, where such a matrix is
employed. By contrast, the signature primitive is significantly faster, and
sub-millisecond execution times for all the instances belonging to category
1. We also report in Table 3 the running times of the signature primitive in
case compressed private keys are employed. In this case, only the value of
the seed generated by a True Random Number Generator (TRNG) and the
value of BT are stored as the private key of the cryptosystem, while all the
other values are computed again before the signature takes place. Although
this approach raises the amount of time required by the signature primitive,
the total running time does not exceed 10 ms even in the case of the category
5 instance assuming that it is possible to apply Grover’s algorithm to SIAs.
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Table 4: Sizes of the key pair,as a function of the chosen category density
(either 13 or
1
6) and Grover speedups (denoted by an identifier expressed
with a greek lowercase letter). We report both the compressed private key
composed of the PRNG seed and BT only, and the entire expanded private
key, and the signature as a function of the chosen category, density and
Grover speedups.
Category ID
Private Key Size Public Key Signature
At rest In memory size size
(B) (kiB) (kiB) (kiB)
1
a3 56 53.66 315.67 3.55
a6 56 21.89 540.80 6.52
α3 56 32.54 828.81 9.32
2–3
b3 64 76.29 1364.28 9.16
b6 80 40.30 3160.47 27.98
β3 64 55.77 3619.48 35.15
4–5
c3 88 86.03 2818.20 18.92
c6 88 69.79 11661.05 89.02
γ3 88 159.01 15590.80 112.17
Finally, in Table 4 we report the sizes of the key pairs for all the pro-
posed instances of LEDAsig, together with the sizes of the corresponding
signatures. We note that the compressed private keys, denoted in the table
as at rest are significantly smaller than their expanded counterpart, and can
be easily fit even in constrained devices.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have designed and implemented an efficient post-quantum digital signa-
ture scheme based on low-density generator matrix codes. The complexity of
all known attacks against this system has been estimated taking into account
both classical and quantum computers. Recent statistical attacks have also
been considered in the estimate of the lifetime of a key pair. This has allowed
designing several instances of the system which achieve given security levels.
Efficient algorithmic solutions have been proposed for the main functions
of this system, which have been used in a software implementation that has
been made publicly available. Performance benchmarks run on this reference
implementation show that the proposed signature scheme can be efficiently
implemented on general purpose computing platforms and achieves compact
key pairs.
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A Alternative Expression for Q˜−1
Let us consider the matrices defined in Section 2.2.3, and let us focus on the
product between A∗ and D−1. We have
A∗ ·D−1 = (A⊗ 1p×1) ·D−1
=
(
A ·D−1)⊗ 1p×1. (63)
Multiplying by B∗T , we obtain
A∗ ·D−1 · B∗T = [(A ·D−1)⊗ 1p×1] · (BT ⊗ 11×p)
=
(
A ·D−1 · BT )⊗ (1p×1 · 11×p)
=
(
A ·D−1 · BT )⊗ 1p×p. (64)
Let us denote
(
A ·D−1 ·BT )⊗ 1p×p as (A ·D−1 ·BT )∗. Equation (14) can
then be rewritten as
Q˜−1 = M˜T + M˜T
(
A ·D−1 ·BT )∗ M˜T . (65)
Considering the fact that 1p×p is invariant to permutations, we can write
Q˜−1 = M˜T +
(
ΠT ·A ·D−1 · BT · ΠT )⊗ 1p×p. (66)
When p is even, we have D = Iz, and so we can further simplify eq. (66),
obtaining
Q˜−1 = M˜T +
(
ΠT · A · Iz ·BT ·ΠT
)⊗ 1p×p
= M˜T +
(
ΠT · A · BT · ΠT )⊗ 1p×p. (67)
B Probability of Success of a Single Step of a SIA
In order to justify expression (36) for PSIA, let us focus on the probability
of success of a single step of a SIA, that is, the probability that an attacker
finds a vector sL with weight wL and the w
′
L bits in e
′ that correspond to
the wL bits set in sL. For this purpose, we need to introduce some notation
and definitions.
Given two binary vectors, v1 and v2, with length n and weight w1 and
w2, respectively, the probability that their bit-wise AND, v1∧ v2, has weight
x is
P∧(n, {v1, v2} , x) =
(w1
x
)(n−w1
w2−x
)( n
w2
) . (68)
In this case, the bit-wise XOR of v1 and v2, v1⊕v2, has weight y = w1+w2−
2x. Hence, in general, the probability that their bit-wise XOR has weight y
is
P⊕(n, {v1, v2} , y) =
( w1
w1+w2−y
2
)( n−w1
w2−
w1+w2−y
2
)
( n
w2
) (69)
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where y must be such that w1 +w2 − y is even.
In order to extend eq. (68) and eq. (69) to the case of more than two vec-
tors, we can proceed as follows. Let us consider the vector vx = v1∧v2, having
weight x ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . ,min (w1, w2)} with probability P∧(n, {v1, v2} , x). If
we add a third vector v3 with weight w3, and compute v1 ∧ v2 ∧ v3, the
resulting vector can have weight y ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . ,min (w1, w2, w3)}. The
probability that this occurs can hence be computed as
P∧(n, {v1, v2, v3} , y) =
min(w1,w2)∑
x=y
P∧(n, {v1, v2} , x)P∧(n, {vx, v3} , y). (70)
Similarly, for the bit-wise XOR of three vectors, we have
P⊕(n, {v1, v2, v3} , y) =
min(w1+w2,n)∑
x=|w1−w2|
P⊕(n, {v1, v2} , x) · P⊕(n, {vx, v3} , y),
(71)
where vx denotes a weight-x vector obtained as v1 ⊕ v2 and |·| returns the
absolute value of its argument. The iterated application of eq. (70) and
eq. (71) allows to compute these probabilities for an arbitrary number of
vectors.
By using these tools, we can estimate the probability of success of a SIA
as follows. The probability that sL has weight wL ≥ d can be computed
through the iterated application of (70). The iterated application of (71),
instead, allows to compute the average weight of s′ = T · s.
Let us suppose that sL has weight wL ≥ d, and let us denote by I the set
of w′L bits in e
′ that correspond to the wL bits set in sL. For small values
of wL, like those necessary to minimize the WF, it can be considered that
I contains a number of bit positions equal to w′L ≈ mswL. The vector e′ is
obtained by summing the rows of ST (each with weight ms) that are selected
by the bits set within e.
The weight of e is the same as that of s′, that is, w in our case. We
focus on one of the wL ≤ w bits set in e which correspond to the intersected
syndrome vector sL and aim at estimating the probability that any of its
corresponding ms bits is set in any of the intercepted vectors e
′. The position
of the bit under exam gives the index of one row of ST that is included in
the sum, and we focus on this row. It contains ms bits, and we now aim
at estimating the probability that any of them is set in the vector resulting
from the sum with the other (w − wL) rows of ST . This occurs if and only
if, at its corresponding column index, the (w − wL) other selected rows of
ST contain an even number of ones. This way, we are considering that the
supports of the considered wL rows of S
T are disjoint, that is, they have no
overlapping bits set. So, we neglect a further mechanism that could cause
cancellation of some of the bits that are of interest for an attacker, thus
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we are considering a facilitated scenario for him. We also consider the case
wL = d, which provides the smallest values of the WF.
Based on these considerations, and taking into account that e can have
its w ones only within the last r bits, the probability that any of the ms bits
of interest is set in the vector resulting from the sum of w rows of ST is
PI1(wL) =
min(l−1,(w−wL))∑
i=0, i even
(l−1
i
)(r−wL−l+1
(w−wL)−i
)( r−wL
(w−wL)
) , (72)
where we have considered that the last block of r rows in ST has column
weight l = ⌊msr/n+ 0.5⌋.
Then we must consider the addition of the random codeword c. For this
purpose, let us define the following probability
PI2(x, y) =
min(x,y)∑
i=0, i even
(y
i
)(n−1−y
x−i
)(n−1
x
) . (73)
Let us suppose that the support of c does not include the position of the
bit set in e that is under exam. In this case, the addition of c has no effect
on the considered bit in e′ if the support of c selects a set of wc rows of
ST having an even number of ones in the column corresponding to that bit.
This occurs with probability PI2(wc,ms − 1). Dually, any bit ∈ I may be
canceled in the sum of the w rows of ST selected by the bits set in e (this
occurs with probability 1−PI1(wL)) and reappear in the sum of the wc rows
of ST selected by c (this occurs with probability 1 − PI2(wc,ms − 1)). A
similar reasoning can be applied when the support of c includes the position
of the bit set in e that is under exam. In this case, the probability that the
other bits of the support of c select a set of wc−1 rows of ST having an even
number of ones in the column of interest is PI2(wc − 1,ms − 1).
Based on these arguments, we can estimate the probability that any of
the w′L bits ∈ I is set in e′ as follows
PI(wL, wc) = {PI1(wL)PI2(wc,ms − 1) + [1− PI1(wL)] [1− PI2(wc,ms − 1)]}
(
1− wc
n
)
+{PI1(wL) [1− PI2(wc − 1,ms − 1)] + [1− PI1(wL)]PI2(wc − 1,ms − 1)}
wc
n
,
(74)
where
(
1− wcn
)
is the probability that the support of c does not include the
position of the bit set in e that is under exam.
We denote by J the complement set of I, and aim at estimating the
probability that, by counting the number of occurrences of each bit set within
the ensemble of intercepted signatures e′, an attacker is able to distinguish
the bits ∈ I from those ∈ J . For this purpose, we can reason as before, with
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the main difference that we do not need to focus on any specific bit of e.
This way, we obtain that the probability that there is a bit set in e′ at a
position ∈ J is
PJ (wL, wc) = PJ1(wL)PI2(wc,ms) + [1− PJ1(wL)] [1− PI2(wc,ms)] , (75)
where
PJ1(wL) =
min(l,(w−wL))∑
i=1, i odd
(l
i
)( r−wL−l
(w−wL)−i
)( r−wL
(w−wL)
) . (76)
Starting from eq. (74) and eq. (75), we can estimate the probability that
a bit in I or J is set exactly x times within a group of L vectors e′
PX,L,x(wL, wc) =
(
L
x
)
PX(wL, wc)
x · [1− PX(wL, wc)]L−x , (77)
where X = I or X = J .
Based on eq. (77), we can compute the probability that all the bits at
positions ∈ I are set at least x times within the L vectors e′ (at least one is
set exactly x times)
PI,L,≥x(wL, wc, w
′
L) =
(
L∑
i=x
PI,L,i(wL, wc)
)w′L
−
(
L∑
i=x+1
PI,L,i(wL, wc)
)w′L
.
(78)
Similarly, we can compute the probability that all bits at positions ∈ J are
set at most x times within the L vectors e′
PJ,L,≤x(wL, wc, w
′
L) =
(
x∑
i=0
PJ,L,i(wL, wc)
)n−w′L
. (79)
Based on these formulas, we can compute the probability that, within the L
vectors e′, all the bits at positions ∈ I are set more times than the bits at
positions ∈ J
PI≥J,L(wL, wc, w
′
L) =
L−1∑
i=0
PJ,L,≤i(wL, wc, w
′
L) · PI,L,≥i+1(wL, wc, w′L). (80)
By multiplying eq. (80) by P∧(r, {s1, s2, . . . , sL} , wL), computed through
the iterated application of eq. (70), we obtain PSIA as expressed by eq.
(36).
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